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Abstract: The tobacco industry has developed an extensive array of
strategies and arguments to prevent or weaken government regulation. These
strategies and arguments are well documented at the domestic level.
However, there remains a need to examine how these arguments are
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reflected in the challenges waged by governments within the World Trade
Organization (WTO). Decisions made at the WTO have the potential to shape
how countries govern. Our analysis was conducted on two novel tobacco
control measures: tobacco additives bans (Canada, United States and Brazil)
and plain, standardized packaging of tobacco products (Australia, New
Zealand, Ireland, EU and UK). We analyzed WTO documents (i.e. meeting
minutes and submissions) (n = 62) in order to identify patterns of
argumentation and compare these patterns with well-documented industry
arguments. The pattern of these arguments reveal that despite the unique
institutional structure of the WTO, country representatives opposing novel
tobacco control measures use the same non-technical arguments as those
that the tobacco industry continues to use to oppose these measures at the
domestic level.
Keywords: Tobacco control, Tobacco industry, Government regulation, Trade
law

1. Introduction
The tobacco industry does not like to be regulated. Tobacco
industry resistance to government regulation through the strategies
they employ has become the model of deceitful corporate practice
(Negin, 2015). By tobacco industry, we are referring to the broad
network of commercial interests associated with tobacco production,
distribution and sale. For example, apart from transnational cigarette
companies, tobacco growers associations such as the International
Tobacco Growers Association are notorious opponents to tobacco
control measures globally (McDaniel et al., 2008). The canon of
tobacco industry strategies includes direct lobbying to shape
government decision-making (Hiilamo, 2003, Howell, 2012, Neuman
et al., 2002 and Peeters et al., 2015); the production and manipulation
of scientific evidence (McDaniel et al., 2008, Muggli et al., 2003, Ong
and Glantz, 2000 and Otanez et al., 2009); the creation, support and
mobilization of manufacturers associations and other front groups
(McDaniel et al., 2008, Mejia et al., 2008, Nakkash and Lee, 2009,
Ong and Glantz, 2000 and Peeters et al., 2015); and the promotion of
voluntary agreements and/or health education initiatives (Crosbie
et al., 2012, Nakkash and Lee, 2009 and Saloojee and Dagli, 2000).
These strategies are supported by a systematic attempt to shape the
discourses pertaining to tobacco in the health and economic domains.
The tobacco industry has vigorously presented arguments that attempt
to minimize the perceived harm of tobacco consumption while ensuring
that the burden of responsibility for consumption is shifted to the
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consumer (Balbach et al., 2006 and Saloojee and Dagli, 2000). In
countries around the world, the tobacco industry has appropriated the
individual rights frame to argue that consumers must be informed but
not controlled (Crosbie et al., 2012 and Hiilamo, 2003). Another
perennial argument made by tobacco interests is that tobacco is an
economic necessity, both as a revenue generator for governments
(Howell, 2012 and Shirane et al., 2012; K. E. Smith, Savell and
Gilmore, 2013) and a source of employment for its citizens (McDaniel
et al., 2008, Nakkash and Lee, 2009 and Ong and Glantz, 2000). The
arguments generated to resist regulation are invoked so often that
they have formed a predictable pattern. In 2011, Action on Smoking
and Health, a UK-based anti-tobacco civil society organization,
categorized the three main industry arguments used to oppose all
forms of tobacco control measures (ASH, 2011): 1) stand up for small
businesses and defend those employed in the tobacco sector, 2)
tobacco control measures will result in a rise in the illicit trade of
tobacco and 3) tobacco control measures are/will be ineffective. The
report's authors drew from empirical evidence to refute each of these
arguments.
At the international level, there have also been efforts to
identify tobacco industry strategies and patterns of argumentation to
oppose global tobacco control. Specifically, work has been conducted
to examine tobacco industry opposition to the Framework Convention
on Tobacco Control (FCTC), the international treaty negotiated and
ratified under the auspices of the World Health Organization
(WHO)that creates an international legal framework to promote
tobacco control amongst its now 180 member countries. This research
found that the tobacco industry used familiar strategies, including
lobbying specific governments in order to derail the negotiations
(Grüning et al., 2011), and consistently asserting the economic
benefits of tobacco production (Mamudu et al., 2008 and Otanez et al.,
2009).
Transnational tobacco companies (TTCs) have also worked
vigorously to strengthen their global presence through market
liberalization. This process is facilitated by direct and indirect efforts to
reduce government control of tobacco products and reduce barriers in
the tobacco supply chain, such as tariff reductions to facilitate the
movement of tobacco products across borders and the easing of
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investment rules to further enhance international supply chains. For
example, Holden and colleagues demonstrate how TTCs attempted to
facilitate China's accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in
order to benefit from trade rules that require market access for foreign
firms (Holden et al., 2010). Scholars have also argued that the greater
the presence of TTCs along the supply chain (i.e. from leaf growing to
sale of final products), the greater the opportunity to influence the
policy landscape in favour of their policy preferences (Bump and Reich,
2013 and Holden and Lee, 2009). Specific to the trade context, recent
research has found that it is primarily low-income countries opposing
tobacco control measures at the WTO (Eckhardt et al., 2015). Eckhardt
et al. (2015) note that given a “lack of a clear pattern of economic
interests among countries opposing tobacco control policies at the
WTO lends support to the proposition that TTCs are exerting influence”
(p. 5). Our study provides further support to this proposition by
analyzing the actual arguments presented at the WTO in opposition to
novel tobacco control measures. Our study provides a logical extension
to existing literature by providing a qualitative analysis of how this
opposition is framed and represented in relation to more generic
patterns of oppositional rhetoric found in policy discourse.
The WTO is arguably the most important forum for agendasetting and decision-making on international economic issues.
Decisions made at the WTO have the potential to shape how countries
govern, including in the areas of public health (Drope and Lencucha,
2014 and McGrady, 2011). Since its founding in 2005, there have been
over thirty tobacco-related challenges at the WTO (Lester, 2015), and
it is widely recognized that states must now vet their tobacco control
measures against WTO law (Drope and Lencucha, 2013, Drope and
Lencucha, 2014, Jarman, 2014, Lencucha and Drope, 2015, McGrady
and Jones, 2013, Mitchell and Voon, 2011a and Mitchell and Voon,
2011b). In the WTO context, member states are granted the space to
question the compatibility of tobacco control measures with the
different agreements that make up the corpus of legal texts that
constitute the WTO. For example, informal challenges (i.e. “questions”
about compatibility) can be raised in the different committees of the
WTO such as the Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) committee or the
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)
committee. If they choose, a Member can also move a complaint to
formal dispute settlement through the Dispute Settlement
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Understanding (DSU). Challenges brought forward at the WTO involve
states arguing against states (state-state), rather than the
aforementioned dynamics in which the tobacco industry directly
challenges state regulations (industry-state). This context is important
for our analysis, as we argue that despite this state-state apparatus,
the same industry arguments are observable. In other words,
governments within this key international venue are repeating
arguments often identical to those promoted by the tobacco industry.
The first tobacco-related trade dispute was brought forward
under the WTO's precursor agreement, the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT). This case involved the United States and
Thailand, and resulted in a decision that forced Thailand to open its
market to transnational tobacco companies (TTC) (McGrady,
2011 and Vateesatokit et al., 2000). Since the panel report was
adopted in 1990, there has been a stream of challenges to tobacco
control measures at the WTO (Lester, 2015). These challenges have
prompted a number of legal scholars and political scientists to analyze
the relationship between tobacco control and the rules that exist in the
WTO system. Much of the thrust of their analyses articulates the ways
in which tobacco control legislation and regulations can be crafted to
reduce the likelihood that such measures could be challenged as being
inconsistent with trade law(Jarman, 2013, Jarman et al., 2012,
Liberman, 2013 and McGrady, 2011; Mitchell and AuthorAnonymous,
2012 and Mitchell and Sheargold, 2014).
The technical-legal scholarship in this field has provided a robust
basis to defend most existing and novel tobacco control measures at
the WTO. Our study complements this legal scholarship utilizing a
sociolinguistic perspective to examine the various formal and informal
challenges to novel tobacco control measures at the WTO. This type of
analysis contributes to the broader understanding of challenges waged
against tobacco control using trade law by identifying the arguments
that governments use to oppose or at least question the technicallegal legitimacy of such measures. The pattern of these arguments
reveals that country representatives oppose novel tobacco control
measures using common non-technical arguments as a basis for the
legal arguments; the same as those used by the tobacco industry to
oppose these measures at the domestic level. We discuss how this
alignment exposes the conflation of government and industry
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interests. From this baseline analysis we discuss how this conflation
reveals a more important dynamic: the relationship between
unsubstantiated or misrepresented information presented as fact and
the rhetoric of opposition. Our examination and categorization of the
rhetoric of opposition to novel tobacco control measures at the WTO
also allows for scrutiny and verifiability of whether this opposition is
indeed based in evidence.

2. Analytic framework
The first task of our analysis is to identify generic patterns of
argumentation, the rhetorical strategies used by representatives to
argue against novel tobacco control legislation. Patterns of
argumentation uncover the expectations governments have of each
other. At one level the expectations will be overt, derived from the
written rules that constitute the system of international law. At
another level the forum for deliberation is itself norm-generating. By
this we mean that through deliberation, meaning is attached to the
written rules, not simply through a technical explication of the
“original” meaning of the rule, but the actual formation of a world of
meaning surrounding these rules, embedding these rules in a system
of facts, values and morality. In this respect, the dialogue and
argumentation within a particular institution, like the WTO, draws from
existing norms and serves to reconfigure such norms by giving
meaning to political practices (such as product regulation) in a broader
social, historical, political and economic context. This perspective is
decidedly constructivist in its assumptions. These assumptions are
best encapsulated by the two basic tenets of constructivism presented
by Alexander Wendt: 1) “that the structures of human association are
determined primarily by shared ideas” and, 2) “that the identities and
interests of purposive actors are constructed by these shared ideas
rather than by a given nature” ( Wendt, 1999). As Robert Cover states
“The rules and principles of justice [are] but a small part of the
normative universe that ought to claim our attention. No set of legal
institutions or prescriptions exists apart from the narratives that locate
it and give it meaning” (Cover, 1983). What Cover is characterizing is
not a form of rule interpretation that uncovers the objective foundation
of legal precepts making the original or intended form more clearly
visible, but rather rules in a wider meaning-making process – a
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shaping and reshaping of the original form. Formal rules are explicit
and can be found in binding international agreements such as the
WTO's TBT, and the WHO's FCTC. When we look to the patterns of
argument within the WTO, we situate them first within the formal
structure of rules. For example, it is not surprising to see arguments
that novel tobacco control legislation is restrictive to trade, because
the basic legal framework of the WTO is oriented towards facilitating
the free movement of goods and services. What is more interesting
from a social science perspective, however, is examining such
argumentation as expressions of implicit norms perpetuated through
discourse amongst countries. Our analytic framework thus categorizes
patterns of argumentation used to support legal assertions. The
specific arguments within these categories, once identified, can be
predicted in future challenges and scrutinized for their accuracy. In
addition, our analysis provides insights into conflicting norms at the
intersection of public health and trade policy.
Our analytic framework draws from the three reactivereactionary theses articulated by Albert Hirschman (Hirschman, 1991)
that comprised common patterns of argumentative opposition to what
he termed “progressive” political reform movements. We use
Hirschman's theses as a heuristic to organize and present our analysis,
as well as situate this analysis within a more general literature on
rhetoric and opposition to policy change. Hirschman defined the first
‘perversity’ thesis as the assertion that “any purposive action to
improve some feature of the political, social or economic order only
serves to exacerbate the condition one wishes to remedy” (Hirschman,
1991). The ‘futility’ thesis “holds that attempts at social transformation
will be unavailing, that they will simply fail to “make a dent””
(Hirschman, 1991). The ‘jeopardy’ thesis “argues that the cost of
proposed change or reform is too high as it engenders some previous,
precious accomplishment” (Hirschman, 1991). Hirschman contends
that these theses “can be invoked by any group that opposes or
criticizes new policy proposals or newly enacted policies”.

3. Methods
Our analysis was conducted on two novel tobacco control
measures: tobacco additives bans (Canada, United States and Brazil)
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and plain, standardized packaging of tobacco products (Australia, New
Zealand, Ireland, EU and UK). We reviewed documents for eight cases
pertaining to these two measures, including meeting minutes of the
TBT committee and TRIPS Council, individual country submissions to
these meetings, and formal country submissions to the Dispute
Settlement Body under the DSU (See Table 1 for included documents).
These cases were chosen because they were challenged either
informally (representatives from members raised concerns about the
measure) or formally (one or more members filed a WTO dispute). The
tobacco additives cases were addressed under the TBT, while the plain
packaging cases were addressed under the TBT, TRIPS and the DSU.
The arguments against the novel tobacco control measures were first
organized according to country and then were entered into NVivo10
qualitative software.
Table 1. Documents included for analysis.
Case

Documents

Brazil -Tobacco
Additives Ban

G/TBT/M/53, G/TBT/M/54, G/TBT/M/55, G/TBT/M/56 and
G/TBT/M/67, G/TBT/N/BRA/407

Canada - Cracking
Down on Tobacco
Marketing Aimed at
Youth Act (Bill C32).

G/TBT/M/49,G/TBT/M/50, G/TBT/M/51, G/TBT/M/52,
G/TBT/M/53, G/TBT/W/329, G/TBT/W/330, G/TBT/W/331 and
G/TBT/W/332

United States –
Clove Cigarettes

G/TBT/M/49 and DS406/1 + country report: Indonesia:
G/TBT/W/323

European Union –
Tobacco Products
Directive

G/TBT/M/59, G/TBT/M/60, G/TBT/M/61, IP/C/M/73 and
IP/C/M/73Add.1 + country reports: Cuba: G/TBT/W/65 and
G/TBT/W/371; Dominican Republic: G/TBT/W/358 and
G/TBT/W/367; Malawi: G/TBT/W/360, G/TBT/W/369 and
G/TBT/W/376; Zimbabwe: G/TBT/W/370; EU: G/TBT/N/EU/88

Australia – Plain
Packaging Bill

IP/C/M/66, G/TBT/M/54, G/TBT/M/55, G/TBT/M/56,
G/TBT/M/57, WT/DSB/M/322

Ireland – Plain
Packaging
Legislation
(Proposed)

G/TBT/M/60, G/TBT/M/61 and G/TBT/M/62 + country reports:
Malawi: G/TBT/W/368, G/TBT/W375 and G/TBT/W387;
Dominican Republic: G/TBT/W/366 and G/TBT/W/374; Cuba:
G/TBT/W/364 and G/TBT/W/380

New Zealand – Plain G/TBT/M/58, G/TBT/M/59, G/TBT/M/61 and
Packing Legislation G/TBT/M/62 + country reports: New Zealand: G/TBT/N/NZL/62
(Proposed)
and G/TBT/N/NZL/62/Add.1; Malawi: G/TBT/W/388;Dominican
Republic: G/TBT/W/355 and G/TBT/W/359; Cuba:
G/TBT/W/356 and G/TBT/W/381; Ukraine: G/TBT/W/384
United Kingdom –
Plain Packaging
Legislation
(Proposed)

G/TBT/M/62 and G/TBT/W/379
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3.1. Analysis
We first analyzed the arguments using Hirschman's three theses
framework to identify the different ways that representatives opposed
novel tobacco control legislation. We then conducted a second level of
analysis to identify the different sub-arguments used to bolster the
overarching three theses. For example, a representative may argue
that plain tobacco packaging will not work (futility thesis), but that
tells us little about the nature of the argument. In this case we
analyzed which arguments were asserted to support the futility claim.
For example, we found that the argument that there was a “lack of
scientific evidence” to support the legislation was used across all of our
cases. We then deconstructed each sub-argument to assess what the
claim was attempting to evoke or target. An overview of our findings is
found in Table 2. Despite a myriad of arguments made against novel
tobacco control measures there is an internal logic to the arguments
that cuts across the cases we analyzed. This logic is tied to the basic
principles underlying the WTO system but draws from the common
arguments put forward by the tobacco industry against tobacco control
measures.
Table 2. Overview of findings.
Thesis
Futility

Argument



Perversity




Jeopardy




There is no scientific evidence that the tobacco control measure
will achieve its intended objectives.
The government must demonstrate through scientific evidence
that the measure will indeed be effective.
The measure will lead to an increase in illicit products which will
lead to an increase in consumption.
The measure will lead to an increase in the illicit market and
potentially more harmful products.
The measure will disproportionately disadvantage developing
economies.
The measure will harm the livelihoods of tobacco farmers and
their families.

3.2. Futility
All of the countries that opposed the two different tobacco
additives bans established by Brazil and Canada asserted that such
bans would not achieve the intended objectives, i.e. that the measures
would be futile. Within these challenges was a reliance on the
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argument captured in the following statement by the representative
from Turkey: “there is no scientific evidence to demonstrate that
additives used in blended tobacco made those products either more
attractive for consumers, more harmful to health or more addictive
and more attractive to youth” (G/TBT/M/53, 2011). Malawi, Zambia,
Mexico, Tanzania, Zimbabwe, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador,
Jordan, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Nicaragua, Honduras,
Cuba and the European Union echoed this argument (G/TBT/M/53,
2011, G/TBT/M/54, 2011 and G/TBT/M/55, 2012). This argument was
used to support the contention that the measure was not “more trade
restrictive than necessary,” a requirement within the TBT agreement.
Article 2.2 of the TBT agreement states:
Members shall ensure that technical regulations are not
prepared, adopted or applied with a view to or with the effect of
creating unnecessary obstacles to international trade. For this purpose,
technical regulations shall not be more trade-restrictive than necessary
to fulfil a legitimate objective, taking account of the risks nonfulfilment would create. Such legitimate objectives are, inter alia:
national security requirements; the prevention of deceptive practices;
protection of human health or safety, animal or plant life or health, or
the environment. In assessing such risks, relevant elements of
consideration are, inter alia: available scientific and technical
information, related processing technology or intended end-uses of
products.
The futility argument was combined with the contention that the
country must provide scientific proof that the legislation will work. The
asserted logic in this argument is that if a measure does not achieve
its intended objective then it is not necessary and a de facto barrier to
trade. This same logic was invoked by Malawi in its questioning of
Ireland's proposal for plain packaging:
“Plain packaging will not work. It will not achieve Ireland's
health objectives. We have stated earlier that protecting health and
reducing youth smoking are entirely legitimate objectives. But plain
packaging will not achieve these objectives, and no credible evidence
exists to demonstrate that it will. Young people decide to smoke based
on various social factors, including peer pressure – not on packaging.
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Ireland's proposed measure will therefore be ineffective”
(G/TBT/W/387, 2014).
The futility argument exposes the salient, but often overlooked,
issue of burden of proof. All of the countries asserted that novel
tobacco control legislation, namely tobacco additives bans and plain
packaging requirements, required scientific evidence to prove that it
would meet its intended objectives. For example, in one of three
submissions to the TBT committee, Malawi challenged the European
Union to provide “credible scientific evidence to support the Tobacco
Products Directive”, specifically that the ingredients bans and
packaging requirements will “reduce smoking initiation and smoking
rates” (G/TBT/W/360, 2013).

3.3. Perversity
Our analysis of the documents revealed further arguments
waged against novel tobacco control measures in the form of the
perversity thesis. The basic argument representing this category is
that the novel tobacco control measure will have unintended harmful
consequences. In the 2011 ASH report, the authors noted that in
addition to industry arguments that tobacco control measures will not
work, the industry almost always asserts that the measure will lead to
an increase in illicit trade and counterfeit tobacco products (ASH,
2011). Our analysis found the illicit trade argument was also used
consistently and vigorously at the WTO, despite the fact that the WTO
has no jurisdiction over illicit trade. In the Australia plain packaging
case Cuba noted that plain packaging would lead to an increase in
illicit trade “given that it would be easier to counterfeit a plain
package” and could also promote the smuggling of “genuine packages”
to satisfy demand (G/TBT/M/54, 2011). The Dominican Republic
concurred that one of the “unwanted effects” of plain packaging would
be a rise in illicit trade. Zambia furthered this argument by stating
“Australia's legislation could expose consumers to more harmful
tobacco products due to the proliferation of counterfeit products whose
quality was not controlled by any regulatory body” (G/TBT/M/55,
2012, p. 55). The first perversity argument is that the measure will
lead to illicit trade and counterfeit products, which will lead to
increased consumption. It was argued that not only will consumption
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increase, but also the products being consumed may be more harmful
because they are not regulated. The illicit trade-counterfeit argument
was less dominant for the additives ban cases. It was referred to by
Malawi in the Brazil, RDC/14/2012 case (Brazil, 2012), but no mention
was made in Canada's Bill C-32 case.
The second argument asserting the perversity thesis is that
plain packaging would place greater competitive pressure on price.
Representatives from the Dominican Republic argued that “if tobacco
products were to be sold in standard packs that make product
differentiation difficult, sellers may feel compelled to compete solely on
the basis of price, causing a drop in retail prices which might in turn
produce an increase in the demand and consumption of tobacco
products, including cigarettes and cigars” (G/TBT/W/355, 2012). This
line of arguments aligns with Hirschman's observation that
“reactionaries” argue that a particular “action will produce, via a chain
of unintended consequences, the exact contrary of the objective being
proclaimed and pursued” ( Hirschman, 1991). Notably, it fails entirely
to account for governments' ability to impose excise taxes to
compensate for any price competition that tobacco firms might engage
in.

3.4. Jeopardy
The jeopardy thesis was supported by two arguments. The first
asserted that the novel tobacco control measure would harm the
strides made by “developing countries” towards economic
development. Referring to Brazil's additives ban, the Former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia specifically invoked this concept when it stated,
“This regulation jeopardizes the economy of countries under
development” (G/TBT/M/53, 2011). Countries who were not major
tobacco exporters to the country being challenged even asserted that
the measure would serve as a “barrier to future growth potential”
(G/TBT/M/53, 2011). Mozambique also referred to the effect that a
tobacco additives ban would have on “export revenue and economic
and development prospects” (G/TBT/M/53, 2011). Similarly, Nigeria
referred to the implications of this measure to “agricultural and rural
development objectives” (G/TBT/M/55, 2012, p. 55). In a submission
to the TBT committee pertaining to Australia's plain packaging
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legislation, the Dominican Republic expressed that they are “worried
about the impact that the proposed measures could have on small and
vulnerable economies which are largely dependent on the production
and export of tobacco and tobacco products” (G/TBT/W/339, 2011).
Chile also highlighted the need for Members to “take account of the
special development, financial and trade needs of developing country
Members, with a view to ensuring that such measures did not create
unnecessary obstacles to exports from developing country Members”
(G/TBT/M/54, 2011).
The representatives aligned their argument with Article 12.3 of
the TBT, which requires representatives to take into account the
special needs of developing countries. In the additives ban cases,
representatives argued that the measure was a de facto ban on
traditional blended tobacco that use Burley tobacco leaf produced by
countries like Malawi and Zambia. In response to the European Union
Tobacco Products Directive (EUTPD), Malawi noted, “25% of the tax
base that supports government operations comes from the tobacco
industry” and “tobacco contributes at least 60% of Malawi's foreign
export earnings” ( G/TBT/W/369, 2013). In the plain packaging cases
the challenges represented a more generic argument that the measure
would “impact small economies that largely depend on the production
and export of tobacco” (G/TBT/W/339, 2011). A similar argument was
made against the EUTPD measure where countries like Zimbabwe
expressed concern that the measure would have a “negative impact on
tobacco producing of developing countries” (G/TBT/M/59, 2013). This
is a salient argument in the context of the WTO regime, where
commentators have noted the challenges that many least-developed
states encounter with the rules of open trade ( Amorim, 2000, Mitchell
and Wallis, 2010 and Sell, 2004). Sell notes that “the costs of
participating in venues such as the WTO can be prohibitive for those
without substantial resources” (Sell, 2004).
The second argument was similar to the first and asserted more
specifically that the tobacco control measure would have a detrimental
effect on the livelihoods of tobacco farmers, personalizing the costs
rather than focusing solely on the aggregate economy. In the Brazil
case, countries such as Malawi, Tanzania and Zimbabwe argued that
the tobacco additives ban would bring social problems to the families
that rely on tobacco growth. Honduras argued that the Brazil case
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would lead to “job losses” as did Malawi, stating that the measure
would impact the approximately 700,000 farmers who cultivated
tobacco in Malawi (G/TBT/M/53, 2011). Pointing to the use of this
group as a rhetorical strategy, this number almost doubled in a
statement made two years later for the EUTPD case where Malawi
argued that the measure would harm the lives of “1.5 million tobacco
farmers” (G/TBT/W/369, 2013). The same two arguments were made
against Australia's plain packaging measure. The principal argument
put forward in the plain packaging cases was that changing the
packaging requirements the measure would place an added economic
burden on the tobacco manufacturers. More generally, as Cuba
argued, such measures were worrisome “above all for the developing
countries with small economies” (G/TBT/W/356, 2012, p. 356).

4. Discussion
Despite the unique legal context of the WTO system, we find
that common tobacco industry arguments have surfaced to challenge
novel tobacco control measures. We discuss two dimensions of this
finding. The first pertains to the rhetoric of opposition and nature of
these types of arguments. The second pertains to the relationship
between industry interests and representation of these interests at the
WTO.
Rhetoric is meant to persuade. One could argue that the ability
for rhetoric to do this is to first assert compelling facts. The tobacco
industry is perhaps the least trustworthy source of scientific
information and interpretation (Gilmore et al., 2015 and Saloojee and
Dagli, 2000). Despite decades of evidence that discredits the tobacco
industry's ability to make scientific claims, it is clear that the
misrepresentation and misuse of science is a tool that the industry
continues to use. A dominant argument across the cases we analyzed
was the assertion that novel tobacco measures will not work and that
there is no scientific evidence to claim effectiveness. This assertion
exists despite the obvious logic that one cannot prove the
effectiveness of something until it is implemented. Moreover, recent
analysis has demonstrated that the industry-sponsored research to
demonstrate the ineffectiveness of plain packaging legislation is
methodologically weak (Hatchard et al., 2014, Laverty et al.,
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2015 and Ulucanlar et al., 2014), while suggesting that the legislation
in Australia (the first country to implement this measure) is indeed
having the intended effect (Scollo et al., 2015 and Wakefield et al.,
2013). Experimental studies have also supported the effectiveness of
plain packaging legislation (Hammond, 2010, Hammond et al.,
2013 and Thrasher et al., 2011). Another analysis has demonstrated
that the evidence used by tobacco interests to oppose plain packaging
legislation was weak and exaggerated (Evans-Reeves et al., 2014).
In many ways, these dynamics are consistent with the broader
so-called “precautionary principle” that has become particularly salient
in discussions and negotiations around environmental policy. The 1992
Rio Declaration states in Principle 15: “Where there are threats of
serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not
be used as a reason to prevent environmental degradation” (UN,
1992). In the case of novel tobacco control measures, the harm of
tobacco products is irrefutable and the preliminary evidence for most
novel measures clearly suggests that there is considerable potential for
effectiveness, and certainly enough to permit trying these newer
tobacco control interventions. Stewart calls this the “non-preclusion
precautionary principle” and argues that “scientific uncertainly should
not automatically preclude regulation of activities that pose risk of
significant harm” (Stewart, 2002).
The second element of rhetorical power is the ability to induce
an emotional connection with the audience. One of the ways that the
rhetoric opposing novel tobacco control measures has attempted to
connect with the hearts of those involved in the inter-state enterprise
is by evoking the protection and promotion of “economic
development”. The jeopardy thesis evokes this development rhetoric
on two levels, one being the gross economic development of the
country and the second being the more personal dimension of
individual employment and economic sustenance. This framing is
resonant in a context where some have argued that the very
legitimacy of the WTO rests on its ability to lift “developing” economies
towards greater parity with high-income countries (Amorim, 2000,
Barton et al., 2010 and Broude, 2006). Broude traces the history of
development objectives within the WTO, arguing that the past two
decades have resulted in the supplanting of the original objectives of
the GATT to expand the production and trade of goods as an end in
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itself, to a development agenda that he attributes to the WTO's
“continued and frustrating quest for legitimacy” (Broude, 2006). A
body of literature reflects this challenging quest for equity among
states in the global economy and the role of the WTO in facilitating this
process. Mitchell and Wallis point out the challenges in the
conceptualization and application of the “special and differential
treatment” principle that is embedded in the WTO legal framework
while suggesting that this principle remains important for small states
or developing economies (Mitchell and Wallis, 2010). Reference to this
scholarship is simply meant to illustrate that arguments about the
development needs of smaller or “developing” economies will likely
resonate in the current context where the issue of equity and the
different needs of states are salient and hotly debated, particularly
when many argue that the WTO dispute settlement system serves to
“exacerbate existing inequalities” between countries (Smith, 2004)
Our findings provide a surprising counterpoint to research that
shows that developing countries do not utilize the WTO dispute
settlement system to the same extent as wealthier countries (Bown
and Hoekman, 2005, Busch and Reinhardt, 2003, Smith,
2004 and Wade, 2003). We find that those who oppose novel tobacco
control measures are primarily developing countries. It should also be
noted that most of the challenges are informal complaints expressed in
the least costly venue, that of WTO committees. Countries like Zambia
have never filed a formal complaint under the DSU at the WTO but are
vociferous opponents in WTO committees to tobacco control measures
(WTO, 2016). Malawi is another vocal opponent of tobacco control
measures and has third party status in the Australia plain packaging
case, while they have only been involved in one other case at the WTO
(WTO, 2016). Cuba and the Dominican Republic have only served as a
complainant in one case at the WTO: the Australia plain packaging
case (WTO, 2016). It is well documented that companies such as Philip
Morris International and British American Tobacco are providing funds
for governments to pursue these disputes (Stumberg, 2013). Our
findings provide more evidence, albeit indirect, of just how close the
relationship is between the tobacco industry and government in these
countries.
One way to undercut the jeopardy argument brought forward by
low-income countries is to demonstrate that the economic benefits of
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tobacco to the tobacco leaf farmers are overstated. Again we return to
the importance of facts in this context of competing rhetoric.
Persuasion is undermined in part if proponents of tobacco control can
demonstrate that the rhetoric of opposition is false. There is a need to
continue to produce sound empirical evidence of the economic risks of
tobacco production and particularly evidence that the desirability of
tobacco farming (i.e. the employment argument) is overstated. This
appears to be the case with Malawi in its own statements at the WTO,
where we found that the stated number of farmers reliant on tobacco
for their livelihoods is exaggerated. A recently published review finds
that tobacco farmers struggle with high labour costs and inflated costs
of inputs provided by the tobacco industry (Lecours, 2014). Perhaps
more importantly, Lecours finds that there is a desperate need for
more research on the economics of tobacco production in low- and
middle-income countries. However, the existing research suggests that
despite the appeal of the rhetoric of protecting the livelihoods of
farmers, the reality may be much different. What this research does
suggest is that tobacco farmers are indeed vulnerable, but not because
of the regulation of the tobacco market. They are vulnerable because
the inequities along the supply chain that make it difficult for them to
sustain a decent livelihood (Otañez and Glantz, 2011 and Otanez
et al., 2009). For example, recent economic survey research from
Zambia illuminates a common scenario in which contracted farmers
pay inflated input costs to leaf-buying companies that – in an
oligopsonistic or even monopsonistic market – then pay farmers at
below-global-market prices, typically trapping the farmers in a
downward spiral of debt that condemns them to more years of growing
tobacco at substantial losses (Goma et al., 2015). As the tobacco leaf
buying firms appear to have calculated, the buyer-friendly situation is
greatly helped by limited markets for other types of goods and that
farmers do not perceive many better options even when there are
some, such as bamboo in Kenya's tobacco-growing regions (Magati
et al., 2012). Tobacco farming and other employment along the value
chain is intrinsically problematic, but for reasons that stem from
tobacco industry practices, limited access to other agricultural supply
chains and a lack of strategic approaches to alternative livelihoods
(Altman et al., 1996, Beaglehole et al., 2015 and Otañez et al., 2007).
The lack of supply chains for alternative agricultural products is not
simply a matter of for market, but also warrants the attention of
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governments to support these alternatives through investment
incentives or other policy instruments. In contrast, countries continue
to incentivize investment in the tobacco sector (Lencucha et al.,
2016).
Returning to the earlier question about the nature of the
relationship between the tobacco industry and governments. Our
findings point to the conflation of the economic and development
objectives of many low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) with the
interests of the tobacco industry through the discourses that align the
two. It is troubling that this dynamic seems particularly common
among governments in LMICs, which in a context of often-higher
vulnerability to undue influence, raises serious questions of good
governance in public health. Our findings suggest that some
governments are readily accepting these problematic arguments and
are willing to promote them in prominent international fora like the
WTO, either because they partly buy into the rhetoric or because they
are complicit in the tobacco industry's malfeasance. However, there is
a need to continue to uncover the internal dynamics of governments
and the relationships among different economic sectors of government
and tobacco interests. The analysis presented in this paper points to
the “what” of argumentation, but does not identify the origins or
process in which these arguments are constructed. We can speculate
that these arguments, because they mirror familiar industry
arguments, are derived from tobacco industry influence but this
postulation needs to be substantiated and explicated through more
qualitative ethnographic research. Our own research in tobaccogrowing countries suggests that the relationship between the economic
sector of government and tobacco interests is both overtly and
covertly visible (Bialous et al., 2014, Chavez et al., 2014, Lencucha
et al., 2015, Lencucha et al., 2015 and Lencucha et al., 2015b).
In what is probably the best-case scenario, governments’ “buyin” in some tobacco-growing countries may derive in part from their
precarious economic situations and the perceived role that tobacco
growing might play in improving them. However, the existing evidence
of meagre livelihoods for many tobacco farmers and widespread
environmental degradation associated with tobacco farming suggests
that governments should revisit these dynamics for the sake of
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sustainable development more broadly (i.e. both economic and
ecological) (Lecours, 2014).
Our study provides the “geography” of the arguments used by
government representatives to resist tobacco control at the WTO.
Tobacco control proponents can use this geography to target
engagement with the economic, agricultural and other sectors of
government. This type of intersectoral engagement within government
is not without its challenges. Communicating information about health
policy issues to non-health sectors is only part of a larger need to
develop institutions within government that can bring together the
different sectors while developing rules, norms and strategies that
work to integrate the different mandates in a way that does not dilute
health policy (Malone and Bialous, 2014 and Malone et al., 2012). For
example, our research conducted in the Philippines and Zambia points
to the continued, often formal, collaboration between the tobacco
industry and economic sectors of government, one obvious component
that would hinder intersectoral work (Lencucha et al.,
2015 and Lencucha et al., 2015b). Finally, the themes we identified
under the three reactionary theses can serve as starting points to
provide evidence and support to correct misconceptions of the
economic significance of tobacco.
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